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In addition to
the OAS, a number of other inter-American institutions are part of the
Summit process’ institutional support, including the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) and others,
depending on the specific area.
Second, the future members of the FTAA already subscribe to a set of
principles, standards and legal and diplomatic institutions within the
inter-American system, including practical measures and cooperative
efforts to protect, defend and promote democracy and human rights. Indeed,
as has been expressly mentioned in the Summit Declarations, the creation
of the FTAA is based on the existence of a community of democracies in the
Americas and on shared political, economic and social values. Given the
existing standards and mechanisms for collective endeavor, this is more
than mere rhetoric. In the inter-American system specifically, the
countries have, within the OAS framework, adopted multilateral procedures
and tools for collective action to confront the problems created when a
democratically constituted system of government is disrupted.5
One such tool is 1991 General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 1080, titled
“Representative Democracy”, which created a procedure for immediate,
multilateral collective action to protect democracy in a member state in
the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular
interruption of the democratic political institutional process. Another is
a new article in the OAS Charter (Article 9, in effect since September
1997), which provides for the possibility of suspending or excluding from
the Organization’s activities any member state government that is not
democratically constituted or that has overthrown the democratically
constituted government by force. It is interesting to note that MERCOSUR
also has a “democracy clause” whereby only democratically constituted
governments can be members.
No decision has as yet been made as to whether the FTAA will also have a
specific provision to temporarily suspend benefits in the event of a
serious or protracted interruption of a democratically constituted
government. Nor has any decision been made as to how FTAA partners would
interact with other existing rules in the inter-American system. What
matters here is that the inter-American system already has a number of
multilateral mechanisms in place to exert a positive influence, one
conducive to protecting, defending and promoting human rights. And
contrary to opinions in some corners, the creation of the FTAA will likely
reinforce those mechanisms.
Thus, while the FTAA negotiations are different from the WTO trade
dialogue in some specific respects, they are also occurring amid a very
different political environment, one featuring systemic interdependencies,
cooperation initiatives among the prospective partners, and institutional
mechanisms and methods. They are part of a broader strategic agenda of
hemispheric partnership and of the more overarching legal architecture of
the inter-American system. In section IV, the argument is made that the
inter-American system makes it easier for the FTAA to settle or make
progress on certain trade-related issues than it would be for the WTO. The
system is also a vehicle for building up support for creation of the FTAA
and explaining its advantages.
III. Why create the FTAA?
What benefits will the FTAA bring to its partners? Why is its
establishment so important? These are basic questions that, in the final
analysis, each nation will have to answer for itself. However, the
following is a summary of some of the main arguments in favor of the FTAA,
grouped by type: economics, policy strategy, and strengthening of the
multilateral trade system.
a. The economic advantages of the FTAA for Latin America and the
Caribbean
The FTAA offers a number of potential benefits for the Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Some would accrue to all countries equally. With
others, however, a distinction must be made between the larger economies
and smaller economies of the region. Five of these benefits are discussed
below.
Greater and more secure access to major markets. The United States’ market
accounts for 85% of the combined gross domestic product of the entire
hemisphere. This one statistic speaks volumes about how important greater
and more secure access to the United States market is to the Latin
American and Caribbean countries. The economies of Central America, the
Caribbean and the Andean Community export between 40% and 50% of their
total exports to the United States and Canada and have relatively broad
access via the Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the Andean Trade Preferences Legislation. Still, these are
unilateral preferences and therefore less secure than a reciprocity-based
arrangement. Furthermore, they do not have dispute-settlement mechanisms
and some of the main products in which these countries are competitive are
excluded from the preferences. These countries, therefore, would have much
to gain from the FTAA.
In the case of MERCOSUR, some 20% of its total exports go to the United
States and Canada, another 25% to the European Union, 31% to the rest of
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 16% to the rest of the world. The
European Union accounts for a larger share of total MERCOSUR exports than
it does for Central America, the Caribbean and the Andean Community
combined. Despite this difference in the structure of foreign trade,
however, the fact is that more than half of MERCOSUR’s exports go to other
countries of the Western Hemisphere, which makes the FTAA project
potentially very important to MERCOSUR’s economic vigor.
While greater access to the United States or Canadian market under the
FTAA will be very advantageous, so will reciprocal access among the Latin
American countries themselves. For example, in the period from 1990 to
1999 exports to other countries of the hemisphere grew at a higher rate in
all subregions of Latin America and the Caribbean than did exports to
other regions of the world.
Trade relief and dispute settlement. The security of market access is
enhanced with disciplines to regulate the use of trade relief provisions
such as safeguards, countervailing duties, and anti-dumping measures.
Disciplines in these areas are a matter of great interest to the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean and a potential source of important
advantages. Significant benefits are also to be gained from having
suitable mechanisms for swift and fair settlement of trade-related
disputes. This is one issue that is becoming more and more crucial in the
growth of intra-hemispheric trade mentioned earlier.
Investment. The increase in direct foreign investments (DFI) is one of the
major benefits associated with free trade treaties and will be one of the
FTAA’s greatest potential benefits. A basic phenomenon of globalization is
the relocation of investments, including shifts to developing countries
and the tapping of multiple opportunities in comparative advantages. The
countries’ participation in the international trade rules facilitates and
spurs this process, with all the benefits that accrue from the buildup of
capital, modernization and job creation, and from learning, technology
transfer and transfer of management and labor skills. Experience shows
that there is a “virtuous circle” between trade treaties and investments.
In the last twenty years, flows of direct foreign investment have grown
faster than trade flows. Latin America and the Caribbean went from
receiving between 10 and 15 billion in direct foreign investment per year
in the early 1990s, to between 60 and 70 billion per year in 1998, 1999
and 2000. The FTAA will be instrumental in establishing productive systems
that are better integrated at the hemispheric level and that afford the
partner countries multiple opportunities to compete and participate.
Services. Quality and competitiveness in the services sectors is essential
to economic growth and development. From banking and financial services to
telecommunications and transportation, from tourism to professional
services, there is a growing awareness that the services businesses are
critical to the economic vitality of every economy in the Americas.
Services represent on average 66% of the hemisphere’s gross domestic
product. The trade in services is even more important to the smaller
economies of the Caribbean and Central America. For many of them, service
exports are the main generator of foreign exchange earnings and jobs.
Various studies have shown that on average service inputs account for 60%
of the value added of manufactures, which means that competitiveness in
industrial goods greatly depends on competitiveness in services. Hence,
the FTAA negotiations in trade in services and the liberalization and
competitiveness that will be fostered through those negotiations are one
of the main benefits that the FTAA will mean for the countries of the
hemisphere.6
Consolidation of the economic reforms and positive signs for investors.
Although the FTAA’s main benefits will come when the agreement enters into
force, the negotiations for the FTAA are already having positive results.
These include a sense of urgency and direction for economic policies,
positive signs for investors, better implementation of the agreements with
the WTO, revitalization of the subregional integration processes, positive
effects on the business sectors’ behavior and strategies, and a sizable
increase in the flows of trade-related technical cooperation.7
b. Benefits of the FTAA for the United States
As high-ranking U.S. government officials have said, the United States has
a strong economic and strategic interest in the creation of the FTAA. From
a policy standpoint, it is part of United States foreign policy for
strengthening peace and democracy in the hemisphere, spurring investment
and development, and raising standards of living.8
Hufbauer, Schott and Kotschwar observe that the trade agreements serve as
a magnet to attract support among neighbors in the hemisphere for other
important (U.S.) political and foreign policy objectives, its anti-drug
efforts, its immigration concerns, its emphasis on better environmental
and labor conditions, and its efforts to profit from market-oriented
policies and democratic practices at the same time … The most important
carrot that the United States government can offer Latin America and the
Caribbean for a broader social agenda of cooperation is talks on trade and
investments.9
From an economic standpoint, Latin America and the Caribbean are one of
the main markets for United States exports, as the following data
illustrate:
▪ Of total U.S. exports of 695
billion dollars in 1999, Europe accounted for 171 billion and Asia 190
billion; the Western Hemisphere, on the other hand, accounted for 308
billion. Of that figure 253 billion went to Canada and Mexico, and 55
billion to the other countries of the Americas.10
▪ U.S. exports to the
hemisphere, excluding Mexico and Canada, practically doubled from 30
billion in 1991 to 55 billion in 1999, and represented its second most
important target market, second only to its NAFTA partners.
▪ The Caribbean Basin by itself
(Central America plus the Caribbean) is a bigger market for U.S. exports
of goods than France, Brazil, China or Australia; its purchases from the
U.S. are double what that country exports each year to the entire African
continent, including South Africa. It is also the third most important
market in the world for U.S. exports of services.
c. Strategic rationale
The rationale for regionalism in the Western Hemisphere is more than just
commercial or economic. There is also a collective security argument to be
made and a political and strategic justification. When the leaders of the
hemisphere met at the Miami Summit in 1994 and launched the initiative to
create the Free Trade Area of the Americas, they framed the initiative in
the context of a broad strategic vision, part of the hemisphere’s
collective efforts to improve and strengthen the democracies, reduce
poverty and discrimination in the hemisphere, and promote sustainable
development. When governments engage in joint exercises to negotiate
clear, transparent, binding and predictable rules in the area of trade or
finance, they do so for economic reasons and also for reasons and
interests of national policy, strategy and development. Striking a balance
among these differing rationales is one of the greatest challenges that
the inter-American system is facing, and a key ingredient in the creation
of the FTAA.
The economic, policy and security objectives each country is pursuing for
itself in the Plan of Action of the Summit and in each of its components,
is a complex question. Not all countries or sectors within a country
rationalize the hemispheric initiatives from the standpoint of the same
national interests and priorities, and much less from the standpoint of
the same sectorial interests. Inasmuch as their function is to articulate
their national public interests, one of the principal challenges for the
leaders of the hemisphere is to continue to explain to the citizenry the
economic, policy and collective security reasons for the regional exercise
in trade negotiations and inter-American cooperation. A number of the
strategic dimensions of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere are
discussed at greater length in section IV.
d. The FTAA’s contribution to the multilateral trade system
The multilateral trade system is one of the twentieth century’s major
accomplishments in the area of global governance. Its performance with
regard to its main objective, which is the gradual liberalization of
trade, has been quite satisfactory. Some contend that its has performed
even better than the world financial system,11
which they attribute to three basic factors: clear and predictable rules,
binding contracts and effective dispute-settlement mechanisms.
In terms of the WTO, regional agreements are exceptions to the principle
of nondiscrimination and most-favored nation. Nevertheless, the formation
of free trade areas or customs unions is one exception that is allowed
under certain conditions, which are spelled out in Article XXIV of the
GATT and Article V of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services).
Economic theory has customarily analyzed the costs and benefits of
regional agreements using the concepts of trade creation or diversion.
However, the recent literature suggests that this traditional approach may
be less useful when applied to the “new regionalism.”12
There is a wealth of evidence from several subregions of the hemisphere
suggesting that the new regionalism does more than just promote
intra-regional trade. As economies open up more and more, over the course
of time the new regionalism brings about generalized economic growth
(dynamic effects) and with that an increase in imports from elsewhere in
the world, thereby contributing to a more vigorous and open global trading
system.
The ministers of trade of the Americas are modeling the FTAA to be
consistent with the rules and disciplines of the WTO. Whether it remains
so in practice will depend upon how in-depth and all-encompassing the
agreement is and what it does to spur growth and liberalization of the
economies of the hemisphere. It will also depend upon whether the
countries adhere to the liberalization timetables once the agreement
enters into force.
IV. The nexus between trade and the other areas of
the inter-American agenda
In this section, four key areas are selected where trade and the other
initiatives of the Summit process strategically intersect. For progress to
be made, concepts need to be refined and clear policies established.
a. Democracy and markets
The first basic theoretical and practical nexus between key areas of
collective endeavor in the hemisphere is between development of markets
and democratic development. A positive correlation between democracy and
markets is a basic postulate of the Summit of the Americas.
Market-oriented policies promote transparency, competition and rules-based
conduct, and are therefore far less accommodative to discretionary and
arbitrary conduct. An argument can be made for the fact encouraging
competition and transparency, as well as clear rules for such areas as
government procurement, conflict resolution and competition, leaves less
room for corruption and collusion and contributes to democratic
development. Then, too, as Jorge Domínguez argues, when market rules are
adopted with the consent of the governed, the rules in place today are
more certain to be there tomorrow as well.13
In this and other important ways, a stable democracy is an
invaluable asset for a country’s investment climate and ultimately for its
development. Beyond these mutual reinforcements, however, is also the
point mentioned earlier, which is that the FTAA was explicitly conceived
as a pact among democratic nations. When it comes into being in 2005, it
will bolster those inter-American mechanisms that exist to protect, defend
and promote democracy.
The optimism that inspired the vision of the Summit of the Americas,
however, is now threatened by realities that drive home the point that
democracy is far more than clean and fair elections. The consolidation of
democracy in Latin America is threatened by more subtle but potentially no
less devastating dangers like corruption, the weakening of the principle
of checks and balances and independent branches of government, impunity
and a weakening of the judiciary, violations of basic freedoms and human
rights, and a polarization among sectors that in many countries makes it
difficult to achieve a minimal consensus on fundamental policies. There
are other problems as well, such as drug trafficking, the crime and fear
that grips most cities, terrorism, marginalization and poverty.14
For the poor and dispossessed, democracy and free trade do not necessarily
add up to an improvement in their daily lives. Hence, one of the strategic
challenges for inter-American cooperation is a collective effort to ensure
that the benefits of greater economic growth induced by economic reforms
and free trade will reach the less advantaged sectors of the population as
well.
b. Facilitating the integration of the smaller economies
The challenge of integrating the smaller and relatively less developed
economies into the FTAA is a particularly important part of the
hemispheric dialogue. Although in strictly economic terms and from the
standpoint of market size, three partners in NAFTA and two members of
MERCOSUR account for more than 90% of the FTAA’s combined market, the FTAA
concept includes 29 other countries in the hemisphere. And just as the
FTAA concept would not work without a Brazil or a Mexico, neither would it
without the Caribbean or Central American countries or the countries of
the Andean Community.
Facilitating the smaller economies’ integration into the FTAA is more than
just an economic challenge. It is an objective in which trade and other
topics on the agenda of hemispheric cooperation closely interact. The
Summits and the Ministerial Declarations recognize the challenge of
integrating, into one free trade area, economies that are so different in
terms of size and level of development. The San José Ministerial
Declaration acknowledged that the FTAA will be a single undertaking and
that all the countries will be subject to the same rights and obligations.
While preferential treatment will be possible with the periods for phasing
in the agreed upon levels of liberalization and rights and obligations, no
such treatment will be accorded with regard to the partners’ ultimate
obligations. The most likely scenario is that these phasing-in periods
will be negotiated country-by-country, sector-by-sector, and
product-by-product.
Some smaller economies have repeatedly voiced concern over the need to
increase the flows of assistance. Some countries have emphasized the need
for additional financing, above and beyond the current technical
assistance efforts.15
Although concerns about the importance of the funds to finance development
may be legitimate, do they have a place in trade negotiations? In the San
José Declaration, the ministers agreed that the answer to this question
was no, and it was with that understanding that the leaders in Santiago
agreed to launch negotiations for the FTAA. Part of the answer is
precisely that the FTAA’s creation is a piece of a much broader framework
of hemispheric cooperation in which parallel efforts are being made in
relevant areas of economic integration and development.
Still, the trade-related initiative is fundamentally different from the
other initiatives: while the trade agreement will be a legally binding
contract, most of the other initiatives consist of cooperative efforts and
voluntary promises of financing and bilateral and multilateral assistance.
Hence the importance of preserving the Summit process’ political
commitment to the global strategic alliance, particularly on the economic
topics that figure on the smaller economies’ development agenda.
c. Environmental and labor concerns
Environmental and labor movements and groups have been pressuring various
governments to build linkages to labor and environmental issues into the
trade agreements. Models of possible linkage range from parallel
agreements like NAFTA, which make provision for trade sanctions, to the
Canada-Chile agreement that makes provision for fines but not sanctions,
to the “softer” systems of transparency and cooperation. While the nexus
between these issues and trade is controversial, it is important to bear
in mind that the labor and trade issues are already part of the
hemispheric agenda for cooperation, by virtue of decisions taken at the
Miami and Santiago Summits.
These issues have to be tackled if the 2005 objectives are to be achieved.
Their intrinsic importance notwithstanding, there are important
differences of position and economic policy between the United States –and
to some degree Canada- on the one hand, and most of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries on the other. The position of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries is that more trade and more investment –not less-
improve labor and environmental standards. And they are willing to
cooperate, and indeed are cooperating on an ambitious agenda on labor- and
environment-related issues, as part of the summit process. But generally,
these countries are opposed to making market access conditional upon labor
and environmental standards.
The reasons for these differences are complex and beyond the scope of this
article.16 It is important to
point out, however, that the Latin American and Caribbean countries are
committed to cooperating and working with the United States and others on
a wide range of issues, both labor-related and environmental, as part of
the summit process in this hemisphere. There are problems with financing
for these cooperation programs, but the political determination is there
and work has been done on an ambitious agenda. Strengthening these
hemispheric initiatives might be one way to improve the legal frameworks
and observance of basic labor rights and suitable environmental standards,
without the disagreement that arises when these issues are carried over
into the area of trade.
So if financial issues are dealt with on a separate track, paralleling the
trade issues that fall with the finance ministers’ area of responsibility,
why not approach labor and environmental issues the same way? The
framework of cooperation established within the inter-American system and
in the Summits of the Americas offers a rare opportunity to move in that
same direction.
d. Other exercises in establishing standards
Finally, the trade initiative is not the only one in which standards are
being established within the context of the Summit initiatives and the
inter-American system. Other key exercises that establish standards are:
development of common standards for telecommunications and
telecommunications equipment, which is the responsibility of the
Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL); the OAS’
Inter-American Convention against Corruption, the Convention on
Transparency in Convention Weapons Acquisition, and the Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism to measure the reduction in the cultivation of
illegal drugs, their consumption and the illicit traffic therein. In the
Capital Markets Initiative, the Ministers of Finance are working with the
Association of Latin American and Caribbean Bank Supervisors on a program
to implement the Basel Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision.
These are just some of the efforts underway to improve the inter-American
multilateral system.
V. Some challenges for the Summit process
and the OAS’ role
The “Alliance for Prosperity” agreed upon at the First Summit of the
Americas, held in Miami in 1994 and then again at the second (Santiago,
1998) and third summits (Quebec, 2001), is a strategic alliance, a broad
economic, social and political pact among the countries of the Americas.
It was well received among most of the Latin American countries, which saw
it as a new cooperative initiative in the post-Cold War era that could
breath new life into the principles and instruments of the inter-American
system.
Some observers and analysts, however, have raised important questions
about the fundamental strategic direction of the incipient community of
nations of the Americas and about the strengthening the inter-American
system and the role of the OAS. Some of those concerns are discussed
below.
First, some have warned of the risk of cracks developing between some of
the component parts of the cohesive strategic vision developed in Miami,
and see signs of weakness at three levels. On the one hand, in practice
more progress has been made on some initiatives than on others. To some
extent, however, this is natural in so complex a process. These analysts
also point to a tendency to compartmentalize the initiatives. This, too,
is something to be expected, given the institutional divisions of labor.
At a deeper level, some are troubled by the fact that the strategic vision
built upon interdependencies and synergies in such key areas as democracy,
trade, the fight against poverty, the war on drugs, labor and
environmental issues, is unraveling. In support of their theory, these
analysts cite the selective and intermittent attention given to some
issues at the expense of others and the fact that some enjoy more
political and institutional support than others do and receive more in the
way of cooperation resources.17
Keeping progress among the various initiatives in balance is, from this
perspective, highly desirable. To do this, the multilateral effort would
have to be strengthened, and the budgets, expertise and tools of the
multilateral institutions reinforced.
One of the basic questions that the strategic issue raises is whether the
summitry process can continue with the same vitality it has had thus far
if serious problems were to arise down the road with the FTAA initiative.
Or conversely, can the FTAA negotiations succeed if the rest of the
hemispheric agenda only plods along and fails to marshal sufficient
cooperation resources?
Others have said that the summitry process needs to be strengthened by
developing objectives with clear and quantifiable goals, to make it easier
to evaluate the progress made toward them.18
A third issue is the need to commit additional resources and funding to
support the initiatives of the summitry process and institutions like the
OAS charged with assisting the governments with these initiatives so that
the summitry process can deploy more human and financial resources to
carry out the objectives. The dilemma for the governments is that if they
want to do more through the inter-American system, they cannot escape the
fact that strong institutions are needed to steer and administer the
multilateral agenda.
All these are important questions that are part of the hemispheric
dialogue taking place in the context of the summitry process and the
inter-American system. The very existence of this dialogue is a sign of
the vitality of the process.
From this discussion, four conclusions can be drawn that are important in
relation to the Summit process and the negotiations of the FTAA.
First, while as trade negotiations go the FTAA’s are different from the
WTO’s in some fundamental ways, the political milieu in which they are
taking place is also different in terms of its systemic interdependencies,
cooperation among eventual partners and institutional mechanisms. The FTAA
negotiations fit into a much larger strategic agenda of hemispheric
cooperation and the even broader architecture of the inter-American
system. This article would argue that because of this the inter-American
system is able to resolve some issues and their linkage to trade in
creative ways that are not options for the WTO negotiations.
Second, balance and internal equilibrium in the trade package is a
fundamental principle for the trade ministers where the FTAA negotiations
are concerned. However, the broader political and strategic motives that
underlie the FTAA within the summitry process, suggest that the concepts
of balance and equilibrium go well beyond the trade issue and that a
number of national interests can be pursued through progress on other
Summit initiatives and through the standards and mechanisms of the
inter-American system. This more expansive concept of balance and
equilibrium can have profound strategic consequences for the FTAA’s
potential partners and the attitudes of various sectors of society toward
the FTAA process. Specifically, the structure of governance for the
Summitry process can be strengthened and constantly adapted to better
reflect the hemispheric consensus on the countries’ political priorities.
Given that a majority of the new concerns regarding globalization, such as
workers’ rights, environmental standards, and human rights, are already
part of the hemispheric process in the form of initiatives paralleling the
trade initiative, a viable and desirable option for the governments would
be to agree to strengthen this process while also making certain that the
FTAA negotiations continue to focus on trade.
Third, to keep the Summits’ strategic approach balanced in practice, the
issues on the agenda of initiatives, the institutional support and the
resources must be a stable structure.19
This would yield a number of benefits: it would improve the learning
process for participants; it would make it easier for the responsible
coordinator countries, the institutions and the Summit meeting itself to
monitor progress; it would increase the transparency and visibility of the
achievements with the various initiatives and, no less important, would
make it easier to educate the public about the economic, political and
security reasons for the new hemispheric alliance. Without that, there
will be an ever-greater risk of a negative reaction to globalization, free
trade and international institutions that will overpower the momentum of
the reform and modernization movement that the Latin American and
Caribbean governments have embarked upon.
Inter-American Summitry –which began in Miami in 1994 and then continued
in Santiago in 1998 and more recently in Quebec in 2001- has established a
truly historic platform for launching cooperative initiatives to tackle
common problems. Those initiatives are drawing upon the collective
strengths of the Americas and include the existing standards and
instruments within the inter-American system. The FTAA is part of this and
will move forward more effectively if matched by parallel progress on the
inter-American system’s other initiatives.
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Weintraub, Sidney (1999) Technical Cooperation Needs for Hemispheric Trade
Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: OAS, Inter-American Council for Integral
Development.
Weintraub, Sidney (2000) Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone.
Imperatives for U.S. Policy in South America, CSIS Press, Washington, D.C.
Notes
(*)
Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs is Director of the OAS Trade Section and former
Minister of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica.
[1] See Weintraub (1999); Salicrup
and Vergara (2000).
[2] Weintraub (1999), p. 4.
[3] One of the databases generated
by the process was an inventory of training opportunities available in
FTAA-relevant areas of policy and trade negotiations for public officials
and the private sector in the region. The “Trade Education Database”
contains information on over 250 trade-related education programs
available in eighteen countries of the Americas, and can currently be
accessed on the FTAA’s official web page, under the section on Technical
Assistance.
[4] César Gaviria (1999).
[5] For a thorough review and
analysis of these mechanisms, see Perina (2000).
[6] For various analyses on the role
of services in hemispheric integration, see Stephenson (2000).
[7] For a fuller explanation of
these benefits, see Salazar-Xirinachs (2001).
[8] Richard Fisher (2000).
[9] Hufbauer, Schott and Kotschwar
(1999).
[10] Data from the International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (www.ita.gov/td.industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/h99t06.txt).
[11] See Hufbauer and Wada (1999).
[12] See Ethier (1998),
Rodriguez-Mendoza (1999), Nagarajan (1998), Devlin and French-Davis
(1999), Devlin and Estevadeordal (2000).
[13] See Domínguez, Jorge (1999)
[14] For a broad discussion of the new
challenges the inter-American system faces in the political and social
realms, see Gaviria (1999).
[15] As for non-concessionary resources,
one of the reasons given during the preparatory phase for rejecting
mechanisms for additional financing was that the problem is not one of a
shortage of resources, since the IDB and other financial organizations
have sufficient funds to lend at market rates; instead, the problem was
the countries’ capacity to absorb those additional funds and incur more
debt.
[16] For more details on the topic, see
Maskus (1997), Elliott (2000), Esty (2000), Destler and Balint (1999),
Salazar-Xirinachs, José M. (2000), Otteman, Potter, Warden and Weintraub
(2001).
[17] For recent works indicating similar
concerns about the Summit process and the strategic vision of the
governments, see Weintraub (2000), Franko (2000), and the Leadership
Council for Inter-American Summitry (1999).
[18] The Leadership Council for
Inter-American Summitry (1999)
[19] Similar recommendations appear in
the Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry (1999).
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