Losing a historical opportunity? A
major historical opportunity to create an economically integrated Western
Hemisphere is in the process of being lost yet once again. The Western
Hemisphere (WH) came closer than ever before to the realization of this
two-centuries’ old dream during its eight years of the process of negotiating
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) between July 1995 and January 2004,
but over the past two years the opportunity and the momentum have been slipping
through the fingers of the participating governments.
Why the
stalemate in the hemispheric integration process?
As originally vetted, the FTAA is the most ambitious free trade
initiative of the postwar trading system. Never before have so many countries of
such widely diverse sizes and levels of development joined together to negotiate
a reciprocal free trade pact. Under the best of circumstances, crafting such a
pact would be extremely challenging. But negotiators have not been so lucky.
Their task has been complicated by the financial crises and political turmoil
that have beset many Latin American countries over the past decade, the new
security imperatives of the post-9/11 world, and now the prospective expiry of
US Trade Promotion Authority in June 2007.
Over the past twelve months
pressing economic and political problems at home have beset Latin American
governments; all face the challenge of adjusting to rapidly changing conditions
in the global economy generated by technological innovation and by the emergence
of the Chinese trading juggernaut. Not surprisingly, questions have been raised
whether governments can fulfill their lofty Summit of the Americas promises—or
whether they even still want to do so.
A battle of influence has also been underway between the two largest
countries in the Hemisphere, Brazil and the United States, both of whom have
changed their perspective on trade and hemispheric integration since the FTAA
process began after the first Summit of the Americas in December 1994. More than
a decade later, these two economic giants, whose support and leadership are
necessary if the dream of integrating the Americas is to become a reality, find
themselves less than fully convinced about the desirability of a
hemispheric-wide free trade agreement. And other countries in Latin America have
turned away from the FTAA to embrace other, rival paths to economic integration,
such as the Boliverian Alternative for the Americas or ALBA, an initiative
ofcreated by Venezuela in 2004 that was and embraced at endin April 2006 in an
expanded versionform by Bolivia and Cuba in the form of a People’s Trade
Agreement. Under the ALBA vision, trade constitutes only one component of an
economic relationship, of which the most important elements are economic
cooperation and product complementarity2.
This alternative vision opposes neo-liberal theories of free trade and
comparative advantage and eschews a market-driven approach in favor of a
state-driven one. Under the agreements that have been concluded through ALBA,
energy is a critical component.
The stalemate in the economic integration
process derives from the fact that countries in the Hemisphere. no longer appear
to define their trade priorities, which have now become an integral part of
their foreign policy, in the same way. This definition coincided at the time of
the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994 during the period of the
“Washington consensus”and remained convergent for seven years, as the FTAA
negotiations moved forward. However, two events occurred in 2002 that in
hindsight represent a watershed in both countries and a turning point for the
definition of their national interests in trade.
In the United States the
summer of 2002 was marked by Congressional passage of Trade Promotion Authority
– the first time that the President had been able to obtain this required
legislative approval to engage in trade negotiations since it had expired at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993, nearly ten years earlier.
This gave US negotiators a new lease on life, but a very short leash within
which to maneuver, as the content of any new trade agreement was already broadly
defined by the terms of the TPA Act. With this in hand, the USTR turned to the
pursuit of a very ambitious trade agenda in bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
– the post-NAFTA template - that required not only market opening but also the
adoption of far-reaching rules in behind-the-border areas. Institutional
transformation became one of the stated goals of U.S. trade policy.
Additionally, US negotiators were given little room to compromise on sensitive
issues such as market access liberalization for certain agricultural products,
trade remedy procedures and mobility of labor as part of a services chapter.
In Brazil, President Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party was elected in the fall
of 2002, the first President from a working class background, running on a more
populist platform than any previously seen.. Although President Lula’s
government has followed an orthodox line with respect to monetary policy, it has
preferred to adopt a more strident rhetoric on trade, associating the FTAA
process with a perceived dominance by the United States and the imposition of a
negotiating agenda and objectives that no longer fit national aspirations.
Brazil’s new government concluded that it had little interest in proceeding
with the FTAA in the then existing framework of negotiations. Brazil’s
redefinition of its national interest was also based in its political ambitions
to retain leadership in South America and to give priority in the trade arena to
the Doha Development Agenda, or the ongoing round of multilateral trade
negotiations under the WTO, where it felt that the prospects for liberalization
in agricultural trade were more promising. In parallel, Brazil pushed for a
regional deal with the European Union over one in the Western Hemisphere where
it felt that the United States would dominate the trade agenda.
Under the insistence of Brazil and its Mercosur
colleagues, a new framework for the FTAA negotiations was developed at a meeting
of Trade Ministers in Miami in November 2003. The framework departed from all
previous trade negotiations and regional agreements in that it called for a core
of concessions focusing on market access (lower tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers on goods, including agriculture) accompanied by minimum obligations
that would be required of all countries in the other negotiating areas,
alongside a discretionary adherence by countries to deeper and more far-reaching
obligations in areas of their choice, such as trade in services, strengthened
intellectual property provisions, government procurement rules, investment, and
transparency, areas that have been highlighted in recent regional and bilateral
free trade agreements (RTA’s) in the Hemisphere.
This two-tiered
approach (a common tier of mutual but minimal obligations focused on market
access, and an upper, voluntary tier of strengthened obligations in various
trade-related disciplines) was immediately dubbed “FTAA à la carte” or “FTAA
lite.” Under this approach, both tiers or both levels of disciplines were to
constitute the FTAA. However, the notion of a “single undertaking” that had been
one of the cornerstones of the FTAA negotiating process since the beginning was
cast aside.
Problems immediately became apparent when FTAA participants
tried to make this new framework operational, the main problem being that the
interests of the U.S. and Brazil are very much at opposite ends of the spectrum.
The lower tier, with its emphasis on market opening, particularly for
agricultural products, is the important one for Brazil. But for the United
States it is the upper tier of strengthened disciplines, especially in the areas
of services and investment where U.S. competitiveness is deemed to be greatest.
that are the focus. After one formal but unsuccessful attempt to develop
procedures for the negotiations under this new approach in February 2004, it has
since proved impossible to moved forward with the negotiations. The United
States and Brazil, as co-chairs of the negotiations, have been unable to come to
an agreement on how to proceed concretely.. Indeed, there has been no
substantive FTAA negotiating meeting since the Miami framework agreement was
agreed.
i) US response to the FTAA stalemate
The US and Brazil have both responded with
active diplomatic initiatives to the stalemate in the FTAA talks. The main
U.S. response has been a series of bilateral free trade negotiations with
several Latin American countries. In its post-NAFTA trade agenda, as evident
in the revised and updated template of FTAs that have been negotiated by the
USTR since 2002, the U.S. has developed an elaborate structure of a large
number of minimum prerequisites for domestic law in various trade-related
areas that its FTA partners must accept (such as strengthened intellectual
property laws and enforcement procedures, standards and technical
regulations, procurement procedures, strengthened regulatory frameworks for
telecommunications and professional services, transparency requirements in
domestic laws for publication, prior comment and review, strengthened
dispute settlement procedures. Although the U.S. prerequisites are not as
extensive as those of the EU, they nonetheless constitute a major set of
changes to internal laws and institutions that pose ambitious challenges to
FTA partners. The United States now has or is negotiating free trade
agreements (FTAs) with the following countries in the Americas: Chile, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic,
Panama, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. This is in addition to the NAFTA with
Canada and Mexico. The countries missing in this FTA web are those in the
Caribbean, along with Venezuela, Bolivia and the four countries of Mercosur
(Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay). All these separate agreements
include, or will include if consummated, the provisions that were made
discretionary under the Miami FTAA framework.
ii) Brazil’s response to the FTAA stalemate:
For its part, Brazil has adopted a similar
trade strategy; it has signed skeletal FTAs with most of its LAC
neighbors (although these cover goods only and exclude both services and
investment, as well as other trade-related issues); product-specific deals
with Mexico and China; and is negotiating a free trade pact with the
European Union (whose progress lags as well). To date, the Brazilian
strategy has scored political points in Latin America but made little
progress in advancing Brazilian export interests in major industrial
markets.
Brazil has sought to expand MERCOSUR, it plus Argentina and Venezuela
make up about half of Latin America’s population and GDP. Venezuela was
invited to become a full member of Mercosur on 9 December 2005. Later that
month Evo Morales was elected president in Bolivia. The Argentinian Carlos
“Cacho” Alvarez, chair of Mercosur’s permanent representatives’ commission,
promptly announced a proposal for Bolivia to join Mercosur as a full member
under the same conditions. With Chile and other members of the Andean
Community already associate members, this expansion sets Mercosur on the way
towards becoming the South American Community of Nations, an initiative
launched in Cuzco, Peru, on 8 December 2004, by the Government of Brazil.
Although Argentina under President Kirchner’s government has been fairly
lukewarm to the creation of the South American Community of Nations,
preferring instead to focus on expansion of Mercosur, nonetheless it has
gone along in sharing the principle of South American-wide integration, At
the Cuzco summit, Preesident Chávez had applied his flair for metaphor to
the process, calling it a train with “a political locomotive and a social
flag, rolling on economic rails with culture as its fuel”. Brazil has
thus countered the US negotiation of regional bilateral FTAs through
focusing on creating a South American identity and economic space. It has
however sought this regional expansion based more on a political and social
platform, rather than an economic one. Like the U.S., Brazil’s initiative
also carries with it clear foreign policy overtones.
At one point
Brazil and other of its Mercosur partners have suggested negotiating a
bilateral FTA with the United States. This idea to date has been rejected,
presumably because it would not include all of the areas that the US TPA
requires in a regional agreement, and the United States would presumably not
wish to provide an example within the hemisphere of an “incomplete” FTA.
Additionally, such an agreement would eliminate any incentive for Mercosur
members to move forward at some point with a revival of the FTAA
negotiations.
iii) The Caribbean response
CARICOM has been concerned about the
progress of the proposed 34-nation hemispheric free trade agreement, since
negotiations broke down in February 2004. Because of energy concerns,
Caribbean leaders are reconsidering the region's strategic alliances,
including a possible free trade agreement with Venezuela as an alternative
to the stalled Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, even as
Venezuela has sought to extend its strategic position in the Caribbean with
its PetroCaribe oil initiative.. This announcement was made by Prime
Minister P.J. Patterson of Jamaica made in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad at a
press conference in February 2006, following his chairing of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee on External
Negotiations. Mr. Patterson also added that there was a need for current
bilateral agreements with Cuba by CARICOM to be converted into a collective
agreement with that country. "All of us are required to examine what are the
prospects of ever reaching a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas. Simply
put, is the FTAA on or is it just going to be a mirage," he said. The
CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) is already conducting a
preliminary study on the region's options on the issue.
CARICOM
members will soon need to define their trade relations as well with the
United States as they face the expiry of the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act (CBTPA) in September 2008. Without an FTAA option at that
point, they will have to decide if they wish to lobby for another extension
of the CTPA or if they prefer to go into a bilateral negotiation of an FTA
with the U.S. Bilateral negotiations that began with Canada in 2003 and that
were to serve as a springboard for this have been proceeding very slowly.
The FTAA and the IV Summit of the Americas
The Summit of the Americas process, begun in December 1994, establishes the
common agenda of the democratically-elected leaders of the hemisphere and the
outcomes of the Summit meetings reflect their shared objectives values and
responsibilities. The Summits provide a unique forum for the heads of state and
heads of governments in the Western Hemisphere to discuss solutions to common
political, economic, and social problems in a multilateral and comprehensive
way, and to establish periodic work programs and priorities to work on these
issues.
The Fourth Summit of the Americas was held on November 4-5, 2005 in Mar del
Plata, Argentina. While the theme of the Summit was "Creating Jobs to Fight
Poverty and Strengthen Democratic Governance," several countries led by the US,
wanted to use the opportunity to re-ignite the stalled talks on the FTAA. Trade
- more specifically the FTAA - thus proved to be the focus of much of the
discussion and the most divisive issue at the Summit, nearly leading to a
collapse of the final agreement in dramatic debate at all levels, including that
of the heads of state.
Government officials argued over whether the final declaration would include key
language on when high-level FTAA negotiations might resume. The turning point
came when President Vicente Fox of Mexico suggested that the FTAA negotiations
go forward with those “like- minded” countries that were prepared to negotiate a
full-fledged agreement, as per the original objectives of the San Jose
Ministerial Declaration. Indeed, it seemed that several countries had made this
suggestion before the Miami framework was accepted at end 2003.. The paragraph
on the FTAA finalized in the Summit Declaration of Mar del Plata (reproduced
below) was agreed in the evening of the last day and includes two options or
points of view with respect to the FTAA – the first time that such a compromise
has occurred at the Summit level since its inception. The first option reflects
the position of 29 countries that wish to go ahead with the FTAA negotiations
and instructs officials responsible for trade from these countries to:
“……………. resume their meetings, during
2006, to examine the difficulties in the FTAA process, in order to overcome
them and advance the negotiations within the framework adopted in Miami in
November 2003. “...
This expression of will by the large majority
of countries in the Hemisphere to move forward in the FTAA talks, even without
the four Mercosur countries and Venezuela, is an important development, as it
paves the way for the possibility that the FTAA negotiations could resume among
like-minded countries. It also is important in proving wrong the assertion that
most Latin American countries see no value in a future FTAA agreement.
The question now will be what happens next. Will the countries that expressed
this opinion really be prepared to act upon it. Will Mexico or Colombia be
prepared to act as the catalyst to move this process forward among the 29? And
will the United States really go forward without Brazil and the other Mercosur
countries in the most important trade initiative of this century?
What next? – After the Mar del Plata Summit
In this new world of the 21st century, with the proliferation of bilateral
FTAs and with the option of the FTAA still on the table, as well as the ongoing
Doha Development Round under the WTO, Latin American and Caribbean countries
find that their trade agenda must be a much more complex one than in the past.
The regional options appear to be at the top of the list for many, as they
pursue bilateral FTAs primarily with the United States and secondarily other LAC
countries.
Text from the Declaration of Mar del
Plata:
19. Recognizing the contribution
that economic integration can make to the achievement of the Summit
objectives of creating jobs to fight poverty and strengthening
democratic governance:
A. Some member states maintain that we take into account the
difficulties that the process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) negotiations has encountered, and we recognize the
significant contribution that the processes of economic integration
and trade liberalization in the Americas can and should make to the
achievement of the Summit objectives to create jobs to fight poverty
and strengthen democratic governance. Therefore, we remain committed
to the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive FTAA Agreement
that aims at expanding trade flows and, at the global level, trade
free from subsidies and trade-distorting practices, with concrete
and substantive benefits for all, taking into account the
differences in the size and the levels of development of the
participating economies and the special needs and special and
differential treatment of the smaller and vulnerable economies. We
will actively participate to ensure a significant outcome of the
Doha Round that will reflect the measures and proposals mentioned in
the previous paragraph. We shall continue to promote the established
practices and activities in the FTAA process that provide
transparency and encourage participation of civil society.
We instruct our officials responsible for trade negotiations to
resume their meetings, during 2006, to examine the difficulties in
the FTAA process, in order to overcome them and advance the
negotiations within the framework adopted in Miami in November 2003.
We also instruct our representatives in the institutions of the
Tripartite Committee to continue allocating the resources necessary
to support the FTAA Administrative Secretariat.
B. Other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are
not yet in place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade
agreement with effective access to markets free from subsidies and
trade-distorting practices, and that takes into account the needs
and sensitivities of all partners, as well as the differences in the
levels of development and size of the economies.
In view of the above, we have agreed to explore both positions in
light of the outcomes of the next World Trade Organization
ministerial meeting. To that end, the Government of Colombia will
undertake consultations with a view to a meeting of the officials
responsible for trade negotiations.
|
a) Growing Adherence to the Bilateral Option
The temptation to bypass the difficulties inherent in multilateral and regional
negotiations and open a direct path to the giant US market has led many
countries to approach the United States for a bilateral FTA, and they have often
found a willing partner. Even on the fringe of the Miami Ministerial Meeting in
November 2003, the United States announced that it would open bilateral
negotiations with some members of the Andean Community - Colombia, Peru and
Ecuador. In some ways this announcement could be considered as important an
outcome in Miami as the changed vision of the FTAA.
The United States accounts for three-fourths of hemispheric trade on the whole
and for the largest share of total trade of the North American, Central
American, Andean and Caribbean countries. Moreover, much of that trade has
already been or will be liberalized under existing and prospective FTAs. The
United States already has implemented FTAs with Canada, Chile, and Mexico and
has ratified pacts with the five Central American countries and the Dominican
Republic (negotiations which were ongoing at the time of the Miami Ministerial
Meeting). The treaty known as the DR-CAFTA was approved by the U.S. Congress in
2005 and was to come into effect on 1 January 2006. There have, however, been
delays in its implementation. An FTA between the U.S. and Panama was near
completion in early 2006.
Negotiations for bilateral FTAs between the
U.S. and some of the Andean Community members began in May 2004 with Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru, and Bolivia as an observer. These negotiations have taken
longer than envisaged. While Peru was able to finalize its FTA with the U.S. in
November 2005, as of early 2006 the negotiations with Colombia and Ecuador were
still ongoing, though expected to conclude no later than mid-2006.
For CARICOM members, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 (CBTPA)
extends US unilateral tariff preferences to most Caribbean exports not covered
by the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) through September 2008. What will soon
be left as not covered by free trade commitments or preferential arrangements
with the largest hemsipheric market will be US trade with Mercosur and with
Venezuela.
In fact, if the United States successfully concludes ongoing FTA talks with
Panama and the Andean countries of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, it will have
achieved free trade with countries that already account for 88 percent of its
two-way trade in the Hemisphere.
This growing web of bilateral FTAs in the Western Hemisphere negotiated by the
United States is leading rapidly to the development and legal consolidation of a
hub-and-spoke arrangement, in which the largest market – the US market – serves
as the hub with the other countries being the spokes. The main spokes still
missing to this wheel are the Caribbean countries and the Mercosur members.
b) The New Template for FTAs
The form, complexity and depth of bilateral agreements has evolved
considerably over the past decade since NAFTA first blazed the trail in 1994.
- Pre-NAFTA type Agreements –
“Old Vision” These agreements were simple in structure, focusing only on
trade in goods. There were no provisions on Rules other than for Goods and
no provisions related to dispute settlement.
- NAFTA type Agreements – “New
Vision” these FTAs, largely modeled on NAFTA, have been negotiated in the
Western Hemisphere since 1994. Comprehensive in their scope and approach to
trade liberalization, these FTAs cover goods, services and investment. They
provide for ambitious and far- reaching objectives for behind-the-border
integration, including substantive disciplines in new areas such as
investment, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and
competition policy, along with sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms.
Such agreements posed a major challenge to Latin American and Caribbean
countries as they eliminated the rationale for the old type of integration
among countries of similar levels of development. A new cost-benefit logic
emerged for developing countries to link up with very large and competitive
markets, propelled by the NAFTA experience and its beneficial impact on
Mexico’s growth. A concept of “new regionalism” began to emerge, typically
involving small countries attempting to link up with larger ones (Canada,
the United States or the European Union).
- Post-NAFTA template for RTAs
- Post-NAFTA FTAs or those signed after the U.S. obtained Trade
Promotion Authority (post 2002) go even further than NAFTA in providing for
deeper disciplines, greater transparency and levels of economic integration.
The new FTAs have pushed the envelope in their inclusion of new and deeper
rules on trade-related issues: Examples of such disciplines include: i)
elimination of Antidumping disciplines and substitution of Safeguard
disciplines (Canada-Chile FTA); ii) inclusion of chapters on Services,
Investment, Government Procurement, and Competition Policy; iii) inclusion
of provisions related to Transparency, Labor and Environmental issues either
in the form of side agreements or more recently through the inclusion of
full provisions within the body of the treaty; iv) experimentation with
different types of instruments to enforce the latter provisions, including
cooperative actions, the possibility of monetary fines, mediation or formal
dispute settlement. A detailed analysis of this new template for FTAs is
found in a comparative study of the Chile-US FTA and the CAFTA-DR-US FTA
that was carried out by the Tripartite Committee (IDB, ECLAC, OAS) and that
can be found at
www.sice.oas.org/TPCStudies/Default.htm
Interestingly, the bilateral FTAs based on this
newer post-2002 template, go further than do the well-established custom unions
in the Western Hemisphere (Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Central American
Common Market and CARICOM) to bring about economic integration, though in theory
this should be a contradiction. While custom unions in the Hemisphere have
focused more heavily on political aspects of integration (especially Mercosur;
Central American Common Market; Andean Community), the economic content of trade
liberalization has been much more curtailed and perfunctory. Whether or not this
will continue, or whether the existing customs unions will make a new push to
deepend their own levels of integration will remain to be seen.
c) Underlying Objectives for pursuing FTAs
With such a wide array of FTAs coming into existence during the past
decade and currently under negotiation, it is useful to examine the various
reasons that might compel countries to favor the regional, especially bilateral
or small-set FTA over a multilateral or a hemispheric option. Ojectives that
countries in the Western Hemisphere have for entering into regional trade
arrangements are of course varied and may include:
- The consolidation of market-oriented
policy reforms
- The enhancement of competitive positions
on world markets
- The attraction of investment
- The advancement of foreign policy
objectives
For many countries, the primary value of their
bilateral FTAs is to obtain secure access to the US or the North American market
since these agreements turn their unilateral preferences into contractual
obligations. By “locking in” open access to markets, FTAs help to considerably
reduce uncertainty about the future course of trade and regulatory policies and
thus facilitate business planning and investment. For many developing countries,
this benefit is a key to the success of their investment-led development
strategies. For small economies, particularly those in the Caribbean and
Central America, the stakes are even greater. For them, the issue is not whether
to integrate with their hemispheric trading partners, but how to do so. Given
their size, heavy reliance on the production and trade of a single commodity or
service, underdeveloped physical infrastructure, and limited human and
technological resources, these countries cannot afford to isolate themselves
from their major markets since they are unlikely on their own to reap sufficient
economies of scale and scope to compete effectively in global markets. The
challenge for these countries is threefold: encouraging growth in trade and
inward investment from their hemispheric trading partners; restructuring their
economies to diversify the mix of production and expand employment
opportunities; and managing the political backlash that inevitably will be
provoked by the substantial adjustment burdens required to implement obligations
under free trade agreements.
Thus on the part of developing Latin
American and Caribbean countries, bilateral trade agreements with developed
economies are viewed on the whole as providing an important venue for increased
and stable access to large markets, as well as instruments for positive
signaling to potential foreign investors. These agreements are also used as
development tools, to push forward programs of domestic policy reform and to
strengthen national institutions.
Although these same objectives can be achieved
through negotiating a trade agreement at the multilateral level, movement here
has been proving to be much slower. Prospects for concluding the Doha
Development Round at end 2006 are still very uncertain. In terms of perceived
benefit for effort, the bilateral option appears quite attractive to many policy
makers who need to finalize a “trade deal” and show concrete results while in
office. The objectives for developed economies to engage in bilateral FTAs in
a North-South context are clearly different from the objectives of their
developing partners. More developed-country governments look for to trade
agreements as first and foremost a foreign policy tool, helpful in solidifying
political, security or strategic objectives. FTAs are perceived as one of the
most effective instruments for creating political allies through binding
economic ties. Additionally, the provisions of FTAs allow for the
developed-country partner to participate in institution strengthening along the
lines that it perceives to be most useful. Having trading partners conduct trade
relations according to the rule of law is a useful precedent for enforcing the
rule of law in other areas as well.
In South-South FTAs, trade agreements
appear to be used much more as vehicles to strengthen political processes or to
weaken historic tensions. They may also be used as leverage to increase
bargaining power vis-à-vis third countries on the multilateral arena.
d) Economic Effects of FTAs in the WH?
What have been some of the economic effects of FTAs in the Western
Hemisphere? Have these been positive and beneficial for members? Evidence for
many agreements is mixed or still inconclusive. However, some general statements
can be made, particularly about the NAFTA-type FTAs.
- Faster and deeper liberalization for
goods and services
FTAs have succeeded in achieving greater market
access for the following reasons: tariff phase-out programs are based on quick,
automatic and nearly universal schedules; the base rate for liberalization
coincides with MFN applied rates for nearly all FTAs; most agreements carry out
liberalization over ten years; the scope of liberalization is nearly universal
liberalization, as contrasted with that of the various multilateral trading
rounds under the WTO.
- Positive effects on rule-making
Recent FTAs have had far-reaching effects on
rule-making in trade-related areas behind the border such as services,
investment, competition policy, government procurement and intellectual property
rights, going beyond the WTO Agreements. They have also brought about a modest
amount of mutual recognition for trade in goods and professional services, and
regulatory harmonization for services.
The robust dispute settlement mechanisms
included in FTAs allow these agreements to be used as commitment mechanisms for
institutional strengthening and for ensuring that reforms are not reversed by
future governments.
- Reducing domestic price distortions
Domestic reforms undertaken as result of FTAs
have brought in more competition and reduced domestic price distortions, for
example as the Dominican Republic moved to reduce tariffs because of the FTA
with Central America.
- Inspiring behavioral changes:
Transparency disciplines in recent FTAs have
reduced the scope for rent-seeking in the private and public sector. They have
also inspired behavioral changes over time in the functioning of political
economy processes and in government-private sector interaction.
Are
FTAs the best trade strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean?:
Some have argued that FTAs are easier to
realize, easier to defend at home and more flexible than global trade
agreements; but are they the best trade strategy for Latin America and the
Caribbean? A certain amount of considerations, as outlined below, may throw some
sobering light on the pursuit of FTAs although these are unlikely to dampen the
enthusaism of policy-makers to conclude them.
- Regional deals require a great amount of
additional negotiating capacity, which is not always available, especially
in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the other hand they provide valuable
experience for developing country negotiators and policy makers,
particularly where most of the issues are overlapping issues.
- Regional agreements may weaken the
bargaining power of developing nations in subsequent trade negotiations,
particularly at the WTO level
- Improved market access to developed
markets, in particular for agricultural products and for the temporary
movement of workers, is very difficult to achieve given the little
bargaining power that most developing countries have when dealing
individually with economic superpowers such as the U.S. or the EU.
- With the proliferation of RTAs with the US
as the Hub, Congress has to vote more often on trade issues, which may
generate a sort of ‘liberalization fatigue’.
- The more FTAs are negotiated with
questionable economic impacts, particularly in the short run, makes it that
much more difficult to justify subsequent trade agreements domestically.
- The complexity of recent FTAs makes them
challenging to implement and administer, and requires considerable
institutional sophistication as well as human capital. Trade deals also
become more complex, because the different parts of the political spectrum
and interest groups can add concerns as a price for their support. (labor
and environment on the one side, and capital movements and intellectual
property rights on the other).
- Provisions on intellectual property rights
contained in North-South FTAs are often more stringent than those in the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
For Latin American and Caribbean countries this may mean the loss of some
policy space (e.g. in addressing public health problems).
- On the other hand, as previously stated,
governments in developing countries may use the more easily realized and
defended FTAs as a tool to justify difficult policy changes that may be in
the best interest of their economies and that they otherwise could not have
managed to push through.
- FTAs may boost intra-regional trade, but
they may also reduce incentives to further liberalize at the multilateral
level. Developing countries that enjoy preferential access to developed
markets are likely to resist further most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff
reductions.
Fitting the many FTAs into broader
hemispheric integration
With the ever-growing web of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs in the
Hemisphere, the future of trade relations is becoming increasingly complex. How
can these individual agreements be fit into some broader, coherent framework and
how could the coexistence of the FTAA and other trade agreements be reconciled?
Currently there are more than 40 trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere,
apart from the ones under negotiation. This presents a challenge as to make this
complex set of trade agreements compatible. Three possible scenarios can be
envisaged, assuming that at one point the FTAA negotiations again move forward
These are the following:
- Growing spider web of RTAs
- À la carte two-tiered approach along lines
of Miami Ministerial Declaration
- FTAA as a docking station for basic market
access
i) Growing spider web of RTAs
Under this scenario the United States would
continue to negotiate bilateral or sub- regional agreements, and reinforce its
position as the center of a hub-and-spoke arrangement in the Hemisphere, with
the other signatories as the spokes. In this scenario, the Latin American and
Caribbean partners of the U.S. will not be able to accumulate origin in their
exports to the biggest market in the world. If the FTAs currently under
negotiation are successfully concluded, then the result of the U.S. piecemeal
approach to trade relations in the Hemisphere will be to unite all the Pacific
Coast countries of North, Central and South America together in free trade with
the United States, if not among themselves. The same would apply to agreements
negotiated by Brazil with countries in the Southern Hemisphere, though on a
smaller scale.
ii) À la carte two-tiered approach:
Under this scenario there would be a common set
of rights and obligations (mandated from the Miami Ministerial Declaration
2003), with countries undertaking different levels of commitment. There would be
two set of rights and obligations that would coexist: A common set shared by all
countries; and, Plurilateral arrangements for participants willing to assume
additional, deeper commitments.
iii) Docking station
Under this scenario there would be hemispheric
disciplines for trade in goods, but the rest of the agenda would be bilateral.
The docking station would be a free trade zone (FTZ) for goods, based on
accumulation of origin, and would include a dispute settlement mechanism and
institutional arrangements. Countries of the hemisphere would progressively link
themselves to the docking station through bilateral negotiations. Other
disciplines such as investment, services, GP and IP would be part of the
bilateral relations between members of the FTA but would not be included in it.
Three main consequences can be imagined as the result of these scenarios:
- A future FTAA would have its own set of
negotiated rules, tariffs and requirements while the exporter decides on a
case-by-case (à la carte) whether to opt for FTAA treatment or treatment
under another sub-regional agreement;
- The FTAA overrides pre-existing agreements
on tariffs, rules of origin and rules in other common issue areas, becoming
the only valid legal agreement governing hemispheric trade, with the other
agreements continuing in effect but retaining essentially their political
character;
- The FTAA does not step into in to regulate
tariffs, origin or technical requirements among countries, which already
have a trade agreement in force.
Why then bother with the FTAA?
The short answer is that an FTAA yields both
economic and foreign policy benefits. First, the FTAA would have beneficial
effects on the conduct of overall economic policy in and economic relations
among the participating countries. Second, the FTAA initiative covers the one
big gap in the free trade matrix of the Western Hemisphere, linking the major
economies of North and South America, whose bilateral trade, as projected by
gravity models, could expand two or three-fold in response to FTA-type reforms.
At the same time, the hemisphere-wide FTA would help harmonize over time the
separate free trade regimes that have been negotiated among regional trading
partners. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the FTAA is the economic engine
that drives hemispheric cooperation on more than 20 initiatives undertaken by
leaders at the Summit of the Americas involving a number of political,
socio-economic, and cultural issues (e.g., promoting education, strengthening
the rule of law, protecting the rights of indigenous peoples).
Conclusion
The policy of concluding individual FTAs in lieu of a hemispheric
agreement has the merit of continuing to further the process of trade
liberalization within the hemisphere, albeit on a piecemeal basis. However it
has the defect of developing into a hub-and-spoke structure in which the United
States has bilateral free trade with many countries, but this freedom of
movement for goods and services cannot be generalized as between the Latin
American signatories. Likewise, Brazil’s creation of a South American free trade
space might stimulate trade among South America, but omits other sub-regions of
the Hemisphere (Caribbean, Central America, North America). Neither approach
serves to stimulate intra-hemispheric trade or investment on the whole, instead
continuing to fragment the various trading partners and regions within the
Americas.
The proliferation of bilateral economic integration agreements as a trade
strategy in the hemisphere may also serve to complicate trading relationships.
Rules of origin often differ among the many agreements. Exporters find
themselves searching for the proper country from which to export goods in order
to ship from a country that has preferential relations with the destination
country. The merit of having a single preferential agreement in the hemisphere
to cover trade flows and trade relations would certainly be more desirable than
the proliferation of the many and varied agreements that now exist. Fostering
economic development is the most important objective of most Latin American and
Caribbean countries. They have been anxious to conclude bilateral FTAs with the
United States because of the access they would gain to the largest hemispheric
market. However, for most countries in the Hemisphere, their ultimate ambition
remains the creation not of a bilateral market but of a hemispheric one, that
promotes south – south trade and investment flows as well as north-south flows.
They well realize that the main beneficiaries of an FTAA would be the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean, primarily because they would achieve free
trade at last with each other by removing their own barriers (often quite
substantial) to intra-hemispheric trade.
The communiqué of the recent Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata shows
that most countries in the Americas wish another opportunity to move forward
together to create an arrangement that would both enhance their trade with the
United States as well as with each other. However, the growing ideological rift
that is opening in Latin America as between those countries embracing trade
liberalization and globalization and those who would appear to be turning
inwards towards populism and greater self-reliance may well impede the
resumption of the FTAA negotiations in the near future. At some point in the
21st century the FTAA may become a reality, but it will not do so without the
necessary political will and leadership. The worthy vision of a free trade area
encompassing all 34 of the democratic countries in the Hemisphere deserves to be
reconsidered before the web of smaller sub-regional agreements becomes too
entangled and this historical opportunity slips away.
|
| The author is
Acting Director of the Department of Trade, Tourism and Competitiveness
at the Organization of American States (OAS). The views expressed in
this paper are those of the author alone and not of the OAS nor any of
its member states. The author would like to recognize and thank Paul
Fisher, Maryse Robert, Theresa Wetter and Cesar Parga for their valuable
comments on the paper and for the insights they provided on the issues
raised. The author can be contacted at sstephenson@oas.org. |
2 - See explanation of the ALBA
on the official website
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/
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